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3 Product and process innovations
All firms producing consumption goods start their production after buying a patent of price vi.
New patents for new varieties are produced in the R&D sector, and their production is described
by the following function
n˙i =
1
a
niLR (12)
where a is an inverse measure of labor productivity in the innovative sector.
Expression (12) shows that the number of new patents produced in the R&D sector is pro-
portional to the units of workers employed in the same sector and to the number of the already
existing varieties, whose production process is characterized by the smallest value of γ, that is γi.
Therefore, we share the assumption in Grossman and Helpman (1991) that nonrivalry of ideas in
the innovative sector gives rise to increasing returns. We could have chosen a different functional
form for (12) which would have avoided the scale effect in Grossman and Helpman (1991). How-
ever, we chose this specification because we would like to show that we can identify a potential
way through which the presence of the scale effect can be mitigated, given that, as we show later,
its consequences are attenuated when process innovations may take place.
Moreover, we assume that γ values are decreasing in m, with
γ1 > γ2 > ... > γm > .... > γi−1 > γi (13)
As a consequence of (12) and (13), when innovations take place, that is when n˙i > 0, new varieties
are produced with the most efficient production process, characterized by the smallest available
value of γ, that is γi.
We know from (12) that labor demand in the innovative sector is
LR =
n˙i
ni
a (14)
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991), we assume that stock market value of a patent, vi,
is at any time equal to the present discounted value of the stream of all following profits. Hence,
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given the interest rate r on a safe asset, we can write that
vi =
∞Z
0
e−rtπidt (15)
The innovative sector is perfectly competitive and the level of employment of workers in the
R&D sector is such that it maximizes profits
πR = vin˙i − wLR (16)
From the first order condition on the previous maximization problem, we obtain the nominal wage
as a function of the price of any new patent vi and the number of varieties of type i, that is
w =
vini
a
(17)
At this stage, we need to specify how γ evolves over time. We assume that the value of γ
evolves along a learning curve and we think that it is more likely that researchers obtain a further
improvement in production processes associated to new patents, which reduces the smallest value
of γ, when the number of patents associated to the existing more efficient technology, ni, becomes
sufficiently large and when the potential demand dimension is large, that is when L is large. The
reason for the first effect is that knowledge accumulates over time and, consequently, it makes
further improvements possible. The rationale for the second effect, which will be discussed later,
is that when demand is larger, researchers’ efforts are increased and productivity improvements
take place sooner. Moreover, in this case, researchers know that there is a competition effect
generated by the entrance of a higher number of firms due to the fact that, as we will show later,
larger values of L, other things equal, tend to increase the rate of growth of varieties, n˙i/ni, and
consequently ni, lowering expected rewards by researchers. In fact, expression (8) shows that
expected profits on varieties of type i are lower when ni is higher. However, given that (8) also
shows that profits for varieties i are higher, the lower γi, researchers increase their efforts to find
improvements in the available production technology to avoid the larger reduction in profits when
L is larger and to try to improve the profitability of new varieties because, once a reduction in γi
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occurs, there is a gap in the present value of the flow of all future operating profits between old
firms and new type firms
∞Z
ti
e−rt (πi(t)− πm(t)) dt = (1− α)
∞Z
ti
e−rt
1
iX
j=1
nj(t)
¡
γj(t)
¢1−σ
µ
1
γσ−1i
− 1
γσ−1m
¶
dt > 0 (18)
We observe, in passing, that the gap described in previous expression decreases as t increases.
At this point we notice that workers and firms engaged in the R&D sector have incentives
in pursuing process innovations, because these innovations allow them to increase the purchasing
power of their wages in terms of new, more productive goods. In fact, as (15) and (18) show,
process innovations increase patents’ prices paid by firms in the final sector, given that they raise
profits realizable by these firms. The increase in patents’ prices is, in turn, accompanied by an
increase in the wage w of workers employed in the R&D sector, because, in the framework we use,
their wage is related to the value of their marginal product of the R&D sector, which depends
on patents’ prices (17). Then, (6) shows that higher wages results in higher purchasing power in
terms of consumption goods, only when process innovations take place, because γ decreases and
w/pi increases. Thus, researchers, who are also consumers, have an incentive to obtain process
innovations. For this reason, we think that it is likely to assume that researchers make deliberate
efforts not only to produce new patents, but also to have more productive processes and we assume
that process innovations take place in the R&D sector provided that a sufficient level of knowledge
is accumulated.
Moreover, we can also assume that decreases in γ are more frequent, or larger, with larger
population because the larger demand could allow researchers to exploit increasing returns to
scale or because workers know, as we show later, that a larger population is associated with a
larger number of researchers in equilibrium, and, therefore, with a larger number of goods on
which process innovations could increase their purchasing power.
Therefore, following previous reasoning, we may think that the evolution of γi depends on ni
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and L with
γ˙i = f (ni, L) (19)
To give an example, and we wont need to assume it in the following of the paper, a simple
specification for (19), could be the following
γ˙i =



ci < 0
0
if niL = χi
if niL < χi
(20)
where χi is a threshold value, which once reached allows us to represent the development of new
and more productive varieties. The threshold is not a constant, given that different stages of
development may require a different number of patents or different sizes of the population and
demand to induce further process improvements. Moreover, ci expresses the size of the process
innovation, whose value is not constant, given that process innovations are certainly not at all
equal in their effects and that they may have different impacts on various stages of the growth
process.
In more details, once γ decreases, from that point in time onward, index i will represent the
new more productive varieties. In particular, to make clear the use of our notation, we note that
varieties of type i can also be named with the last integer number of the series for m, which we call
h withm = 1, 2, ......, (h = i). Once there is an improvement along the learning curve, described for
instance by (19), the series continues in the following way: m = 1, 2, ......, h, (h+ 1 = i). Moreover,
we notice that in the moment of the change in γ, (12) can be written as follows
nh+1 = n˙h+1 =
1
a
nhLR (21)
According to (20), the evolution of γ is related to the “adjusted” size of the market, niL.
In summary, and more generally with (19), for a given size of the market L, more firms
operating in the economy along the frontier (higher ni) increase the accumulated knowledge which
allows researchers in the R&D sector to be able to find the way to introduce further improvements
in productivity of firms associated with new patents. But these improvements are more likely
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to occur when larger dimensions of the market, L, push researchers to increase their efforts in
searching for process innovations; firstly, to avoid the decrease in the value of new patents which
otherwise would be generated by smaller profits due to the higher competition and, secondly, to
increase their purchasing power on a larger number of new more productive varieties.
We know that the no arbitrage condition between patents and a safe asset implies that the
following Fisher equation must be satisfied for every value of m
πm
vm
+
v˙m
vm
= r (22)
We recall that while for m 6= i innovation does not introduce any new varieties, these are
developed for the i− th group of firms.
4 Moving equilibrium
In this section we describe the properties of the equilibrium of the model, which will be character-
ized as a moving equilibrium, given that we assume that the number of firms is the slow variable
of the economy, while all other variables are the fast variables.5
In particular, we know from expression (11) that in equilibrium the labor market is clearing.
From (10), (6) and (17) we obtain that employment in the final sector is
LC =
α
w
=
αa
vini
(23)
Thus, in any periods between the two subsequent reduction in γi, the market clearing condition
(11) can be rewritten as
L =
n˙i
ni
a+
αa
vini
Let us denote with Vi the inverse of the value of the aggregate existing stock of patents of firms
of type i, Vi = 1vini . Then, from the previous equation, we derive the growth rate of firms of type
5 See Schlicht (1985, 1997).
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